Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122 (2017)

Authors
Harold Langsam
University of Virginia
Abstract
Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2016.1222627
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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Citations of this work BETA

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3637-3657.
Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.

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