The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable
European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15 (2021)
Abstract
This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al.. They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew and Titelbaum and Hart, 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and Titelbaum, 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al..Author Profiles
DOI
10.1007/s13194-021-00352-x
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Citations of this work
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Localizable Particles in the Classical Limit of Quantum Field Theory.Rory Soiffer, Jonah Librande & Benjamin H. Feintzeig - 2021 - Foundations of Physics 51 (2):1-31.
References found in this work
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.