European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):190–209 (2001)

Authors
Gerald Lang
University of Leeds
Abstract
In a series of influential papers, John McDowell has argued that the rule‐following considerations explored in Wittgenstein’s later work provide support for a particularist form of moral objectivity. The article distinguishes three such arguments in McDowell’s writings, labelled the Anthropocentricism Argument, the Shapelessness Argument, and the Anti‐Humean Argument, respectively, and the author disputes the effectiveness of each of them. As far as these metaethical debates are concerned, the article concludes that the rule‐following considerations leave everything in their place
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0378.00135
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Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.
Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.

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