Abstract

The central problem for ethics is epistemic scepticism. This is taken to begin, in modern times, with Hume and to be codified by Hegel's insistence that no objective account of experience can be given without reference to the subjectivity of the experiencer and unless there is a non-subjective account of the process of representation. ;Epistemic scepticism proclaims classical natural right as a naturalistic fallacy and, by the introduction of modern natural right, leads inevitably to ethical relativism. Two hundred years of attempts have not produced any refutation of scepticism, nor any theory that could pass Hegel's test. They have instead strongly indicated that there is no way to satisfy these requirements unless the metaphysical question of language is solved first. ;This thesis will attempt the refutation of the problems of epistemic scepticism, ethical relativism and metaphysical nihilism by shedding light on the meta-theories that are the unspoken assumptions of contemporary philosophy, by showingthat they are unjustified and indicating what went wrong and why. It will also provide for the right metaphysics that will allow the required refutation