The trajectory of self

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):481-482 (2016)

Authors
Tony Cheng
University College London
Timothy Joseph Lane
Taipei Medical College
Abstract
In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logical processing. In other words, where Dennett regards self as analogous to a center of gravity, a simplification posited by observers, Sui and Humphreys regard self as a function that modulates mental processes. In practice, however, the concept of ‘self’ they employ is not unlike Dennett's. We side with Sui and Humphreys in hold- ing that self-reference modulates mental processes: reference to self during a task can bind memory to source, increase perceptual integration, and link attention to decision making, among other things. What is more, these functions are not reducible to other factors such as semantic coding, familiarity, or reward [3]. But whereas Sui and Humphreys contribute important empirical detail, the binding functions they describe are compatible with Dennett's version of functionalism, which treats self as an artifact of social process.
Keywords self  binding  resting state  pre-stimulus activity  Dennett
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.004
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Brain at Rest: What It Is Doing and Why That Matters.Colin Klein - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):974-985.
Binding by Synchronisation: A Task-Dependence Hypothesis.Guido Bugmann - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):685-686.
Immanuel Kant's Mind and the Brain's Resting State.Georg Northoff - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (7):356-359.
Verification, Skepticism, and Consciousness.William E. Seager - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):113-133.
Is Depressive Rumination Rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In T. W. Hung & T. J. Lane (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. pp. 121-145.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-03-09

Total views
297 ( #20,483 of 2,272,237 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #9,055 of 2,272,237 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature