Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223 (2020)

Varied evidence confirms more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys widespread intuitive support. We put forward a novel explication of one notion of varied evidence and the Variety of Evidence Thesis within Bayesian models of scientific inference by appealing to measures of entropy. Our explication of the Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in many of our models which also pronounce on disconfirmatory and discordant evidence. We argue that our models pronounce rightly. Against a backdrop of failures of the Variety of Evidence Thesis, the intuitive case for the Variety of Evidence Thesis emerges strengthened. Our models do however not support the general case for the thesis since our explication of it fails to hold in certain cases. The parameter space of this failure is explored and an explanation for the failure is offered.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-0024-6
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References found in this work BETA

Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.

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Citations of this work BETA

On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias.Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4):525-549.
Bayes Nets and Rationality.Stephan Hartmann - forthcoming - In The Handbook of Rationality. Boston, Massachusetts, USA:
Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.

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