History of European Ideas 28 (1-2):33-41 (2002)

This article suggests that the enterprise of Mark Bevir's book , is the reverse of what his title implies. Bevir seeks not to delineate the peculiar logic of a specialised subfield of history called the ‘history of ideas’, but rather the logic which underlies historical pursuit considered in general as the ‘explanation of belief’. If this is so, then the relationship between belief, meaning, and speech act in intellectual texts, and the task and method of the intellectual historian, must be reinterpreted along lines closer to those of Quentin Skinner than Bevir would allow. Indeed, Bevir's criticism of Skinner, which hinges on his own account of malapropism, is shown here to fail. The article concludes with brief reflections on the purpose and nature of studying the ‘history of ideas’
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DOI 10.1016/S0191-6599(02)00005-0
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An Autobiography.R. G. Collingwood - 1939 - New York: Etc.]Oxford University Press.
The Logic of the History of Ideas.Mark Bevir - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.

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