Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):11-32 (2012)

Sandra Lapointe
McMaster University
In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately conflates the two notions. I argue further that Kant's views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano's criticism of the Kantian position and his redefinition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian philosophers generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important differences between the two positions.
Keywords Kant  logic  Bolzano
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DOI 10.1163/9789401208338_003
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Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic.Nicholas Stang - 2014 - In Sandra Lapointe & Clinton Tolley (eds.), The New Anti-Kant. pp. 193–234.

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