Kant Studien 101 (4):445-464 (2010)

Eric LaRock
Oakland University
After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an explanatory contribution to our theory of unified consciousness and thus could not be eliminated on parsimonious grounds alone.
Keywords Binding, Consciousness, Emergent Dualism, Hasker, Neuronal Synchrony
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DOI 10.1515/kant.2010.028
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