Hard Problems of Unified Experience from the Perspective of Neuroscience

In Mihretu P. Guta (ed.), Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties. New York: Routledge. pp. 223-240 (2019)

Authors
Eric LaRock
Oakland University
Abstract
I examine several leading neuronal accounts of binding and conclude that, while those neuronal accounts might be necessary in some important senses (e.g., when it comes to error minimization), they fail to provide satisfying solutions to the hard problems of unified experience. I then present a new, testable hypothesis called emergent subject dualism to account for the unity of experience across modalities of the brain.
Keywords Anthesthesia  Consciousness  Emergent Subject Dualism  Hypothesis  Neuronal Hubs  Testability
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,466
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism.Eric LaRock - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118.
How Subjects Can Emerge From Neurons.Eric LaRock & Mostyn Jones - 2019 - Process Studies 48 (1):40-58.
Neuroelectrical Approaches to Binding Problems.Mostyn W. Jones - 2016 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 2 (37).
Intentionality and Experience.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):299-318.
The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.
Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.Igor Gasparov - 2013 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness?Pete Mandik - 2008 - In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri.
The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-08

Total views
2 ( #1,353,718 of 2,374,858 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #559,821 of 2,374,858 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes