How to think about informal proofs

Synthese 187 (2):715-730 (2012)
Abstract
It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the field
Keywords Informal proof  Mathematical practice  Inferential action  Argumentation theory  Speech-act
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0007-5
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References found in this work BETA
Argumentation Schemes.Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
How Experiments End.Peter Galison - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):103-106.
Why Do We Prove Theorems?Y. Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
Why Do Mathematicians Re-Prove Theorems?John W. Dawson Jr - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):269-286.

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Why Do We Prove Theorems?Y. Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
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