Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):95-116 (2004)

Abstract
The philosophical problem of personal identity starts with something like Descartes’ famous question—“But what then am I?”—construed as an inquiry into the most fundamental nature of creatures like us. Let us stipulate that creatures like us are most fundamentally persons. That is, ‘person’ is the name of our..
Keywords Animal  Body  Metaphysics  Person  Descartes
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ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200420232
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