W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may be perfectly legitimate, even though, to some extent, they may be applicable in different contexts. Roughly speaking, a sentence is true in the empiricist sense if it belongs to a theory which entails all observation sentences which would be assented to by the speakers of the language in question (and no observation sentences which would be dissented from by these speakers). Various objections to this idea are discussed and rejected
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DOI 10.1080/00201749408602364
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References found in this work BETA

Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized.Hilary Putnam - 1985 - In Synthese. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-24.
Why Reason Can’T Be Naturalized.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 52 (1):229--47.

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Citations of this work BETA

Davidsons's Objections to Quine's Empiricism.Lars Bergström - 2001 - In P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson. CSLI Publications.

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