Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge

Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-252 (1999)
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Abstract

Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first and second-order beliefs that is posited by Shoemaker's self-intimation thesis

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10.1023/a:1004306526255

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References found in this work

Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.
Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
On knowing one’s own mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.

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