Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?

Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (4):1-27 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can Artificial Intelligence be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,515

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-30

Downloads
57 (#302,915)

6 months
18 (#237,074)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Francisco Lara
University of the Philippines, Diliman

References found in this work

The idea of justice.Amartya Sen - 2009 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Julian Savulescu.
Superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 80 references / Add more references