Behavior and Philosophy 34:39-58 (2006)

Authors
Eric LaRock
Oakland University
Abstract
A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness
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References found in this work BETA

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Is Consciousness a Brain Process.Ullin T. Place - 1956 - British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Consciousness Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 419--437.

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