Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
University of Helsinki
I begin with various cases that have been used to motivate the need for a more “subjective” kind of evaluation, and accompanying norms, in both the practical and theoretical domains. I outline a broad paradigm for thinking about such evaluations, which I call perspectivist. According to this paradigm, what one ought to do and believe is fixed by one’s perspective, which is a kind of representation of the world (e.g. the propositions constituting one’s evidence). My purpose is to sketch and defend an alternative framework. I first sketch how what I call dispositional evaluations work, and the kinds of evaluative norms they give rise to (roughly: ‘Manifest good dispositions!’). I then argue that my view has several advantages: it can avoid a range of problems faced by perspectivist views, and it provides a unified picture of (evaluative) norms governing actions, choices, and beliefs. A broader theme that emerges is that a perspectivist focus on issues of epistemic access, or on what is present to an agent’s mind, may prevent us from seeing the full range of options available: too often both sides of various disputes (e.g. internalists and externalists) have been locked in what is essentially a perspectivist framework.
Keywords Perspectivism  Subjective oughts  Luminosity  Dispositions  Epistemic access
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Coherence as Competence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):453-376.
The Cake Theory of Credit.Jaakko Hirvelä & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.

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