Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments

Synthese 166 (2):359-374 (2009)
Authors
Peter Nathan Lasersohn
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
Recent arguments for relativist semantic theories have centered on the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement.” This paper offers independent motivation for such theories, based on the interpretation of predicates of personal taste in certain attitude contexts and presuppositional constructions. It is argued that the correct interpretation falls out naturally from a relativist theory, but requires special stipulation in a theory which appeals instead to the use of hidden indexicals; and that a hidden indexical analysis presents problems for contemporary syntactic theory.
Keywords Relativism  Taste  Factives
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9280-8
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

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Citations of this work BETA

Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.

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