Single premise deduction and risk

Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173 (2008)
Abstract
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure. I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
Keywords closure  knowledge  deduction  risk  paradox  transfer of warrant  inference
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9157-1
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Modal Argument is Not Circular.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):371 - 372.
Mr. Magoo's Mistake.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289 - 306.
Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

227 ( #15,638 of 2,152,599 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #35,937 of 2,152,599 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums