Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173 (2008)

Authors
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
University of Helsinki
Abstract
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure. I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
Keywords closure  knowledge  deduction  risk  paradox  transfer of warrant  inference
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9157-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA

Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

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