Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173 (2008)
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure. I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
|Keywords||closure knowledge deduction risk paradox transfer of warrant inference|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 13-26.
Citations of this work BETA
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
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