The Dogmatism Puzzle

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432 (2014)
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Abstract

According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called Entitlement, a principle stating roughly that knowing that a piece of evidence is misleading entitles one to disregard it. The plausibility of Entitlement should cast doubt not only on the defeat solution, but on an assumption that has often been taken for granted: the falsity of the dogmatist conclusion of the original puzzle. I conclude that we face a dilemma between giving up Entitlement and living with dogmatism.

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Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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