Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115 (2019)

Authors
N. G. Laskowski
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract
It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it difficult to believe reductive theses in ethics. I argue that the distinctiveness of the normative concepts we use in thinking about reductive theses offers a more promising explanation of this psychological phenomenon than the falsity of Reductive Realism. To identify the distinctiveness of normative concepts, I use resources from familiar Hybrid views of normative language and thought to develop a Hybrid view of normative concepts. In addition to using this new Hybrid view to explain why reductive theses are difficult to believe, I show how to preserve several patterns of inference involving normative concepts that, intuitively, it is possible to make, and hence answer an important recent challenge to Hybrid views from Mark Schroeder.
Keywords Normative Concepts  Hybridism  Reductive Realism  Robust Realism  Moral Concepts  Moral  meta-ethics  naturalism  just too different  boyd  cornell realism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-1007-1
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.

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Citations of this work BETA

Resisting Reductive Realism.N. G. Laskowski - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 96 - 117.
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.
‘Ought’-Contextualism Beyond the Parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.
Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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Naturalizing the Normative.Eric H. Gampel - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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