What is token physicalism?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290 (2003)
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Abstract

The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than substance physicalism, and as a good statement on its own or in conjunction with other theses of minimal physicalism.[i] It is also generally simply assumed to be true, though Davidson has offered a famous argument for its truth, and some have argued against it. Many of those arguing against it are substance physicalists, indicating that they believe token physicalism to be a strictly stronger view.[ii].

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Noa Latham
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Anomalous monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Token physicalism and functional individuation.James DiFrisco - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):309-329.
Monismo anômalo: uma reconstrução e revisão da literatura.Marcelo Fischborn - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):53-66.

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