A confutation of convergent realism

Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49 (1981)

Authors
Larry Laudan
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific realism
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DOI 10.1086/288975
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