A confutation of convergent realism

Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49 (1981)
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Abstract

This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific realism

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Author's Profile

Larry Laudan
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press. pp. 60-105.
Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction.H. R. Post - 1971 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 2 (3):213.

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