Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):136-147 (2019)

Matthias Michel
New York University
The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Based on this we argue that the meta-problem may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, created in part because we inadvertently focused too much on the so-called 'hard problem', limiting scientific progress.
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Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.
Higher-Order Theories Do Just Fine.Matthias Michel & Hakwan Lau - forthcoming - Cognitive Neuroscience.

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