Philosophy of Science 56 (2):221-237 (1989)

Larry Laudan
University of Texas at Austin
It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustrating how a rational community with divergent standards can encourage innovation and eventually reach consensus, recent developments in geophysics are discussed at some length
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DOI 10.1086/289484
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.
Kuhn Reconstructed: Incommensurability Without Relativism.Michael E. Malone - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):69-93.

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