Freedom, Spontaneity and the Noumenal Perspective

Kant Studien 99 (3):312-338 (2008)
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For Kant, both morality and the possibility of objective knowledge presuppose freedom. His theory of freedom is based on the distinction between phenomena and noumena, concepts which represent two different ways of viewing things. The question, however, is whether it is justified to take the noumenal perspective in addition to the phenomenal one. Isn’t freedom an illusion, if we regard ourselves as free, while in fact we are not? The crux of the problem lies in recognizing that there is no objective fact as far as freedom is concerned, for objective fact is a category that belongs to the phenomenal world. Nevertheless, it is argued that freedom must be presupposed in order to account for the objectivity of the phenomenal world as a whole.



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Chong-Fuk Lau
Chinese University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
Kant-Bibliographie 2008.Margit Ruffing - 2010 - Kant Studien 101 (4):487-538.

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