À la défense du déontologisme doxastique

Dialogue 48 (1):37 (2009)
Authors
Daniel Laurier
Université de Montréal
Abstract
ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and that these two sorts of reasons are incommensurable
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217309090039
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References found in this work BETA

Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.

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