La philosophic ouverte de F. Gonseth aboutit‐elle à une conception réaliste ou relativiste des théories scientifiques?

Dialectica 44 (3‐4):287-293 (1990)
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Abstract

RésuméĽauteur tente ?abord de restreindre la notion de réalisme scientifique. ll montre ensuite que sa version relativisée de la philosophic transcendentale et la philosophic ouverte de F. Gonseth ne sont pas à ranger parmi les conceptions réalistes, mais bien dans la tradition du pragmatisme.SummaryThe author first proposes a more restrictive conception of scientific realism than the usually accepted one. He then shows that his own relativized version of transcendentalism and F. Gon‐seth's open philosophy are not to be classified as realistic but belong to a brand of pragmatism incompatible with scientific realism in the strict sense described

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Citations of this work

Gonseth and Quine.Michael Esfeld - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):199-219.
Gonseth and Quine.Michael Esfeld - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):199–219.

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