Nonconceptual contents vs nonconceptual states

Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):23-43 (2005)
Authors
Daniel Laurier
Université de Montréal
Abstract
The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be understood as being simply one which is composed of concepts, without compromising this intuitive view of the relation between beliefs and experiences.
Keywords Believability  Concept  Content  Epistemology  State
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1163/18756735-068001002
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Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.

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