Foundations of Physics 38 (12):1110-1132 (2008)

Authors
Federico Laudisa
University of Milan Bicocca
Abstract
According to a widespread view, the Bell theorem establishes the untenability of so-called ‘local realism’. On the basis of this view, recent proposals by Leggett, Zeilinger and others have been developed according to which it can be proved that even some non-local realistic theories have to be ruled out. As a consequence, within this view the Bell theorem allows one to establish that no reasonable form of realism, be it local or non-local, can be made compatible with the (experimentally tested) predictions of quantum mechanics. In the present paper it is argued that the Bell theorem has demonstrably nothing to do with the ‘realism’ as defined by these authors and that, as a consequence, their conclusions about the foundational significance of the Bell theorem are unjustified
Keywords Bell theorem  Non-locality  Hidden-variable theories  Non-local realistic theories  Bohmian mechanics
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DOI 10.1007/s10701-008-9255-8
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Quantum Locality.Robert B. Griffiths - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (4):705-733.
Non-Realism: Deep Thought or a Soft Option?Nicolas Gisin - 2012 - Foundations of Physics 42 (1):80-85.
Against the 'No-Go' Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics.Federico Laudisa - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (1):1-17.
Stop Making Sense of Bell’s Theorem and Nonlocality?Federico Laudisa - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2):293-306.

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