Some problems facing intuitionist meta-methodologies

Synthese 67 (1):115 - 129 (1986)
Abstract
Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such positions lack is a base from which to inform, criticize, or restructure our core methodological intuitions. To acquiesce in this is to deny that exemplary cases can serve the sort of warranting role required for intuitionism. This point is reinforced by a series of reasons for denying the warranting role of pre-analytic judgments of rationality. These reasons point the way toward an improved approach to meta-methodology.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485513
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References found in this work BETA
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Experience and Prediction.Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View.Sebastian Lutz - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):77–120.
In the Tracks of the Historicist Movement: Re-Assessing the Carnap-Kuhn Connection.Guy S. Axtell - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):119-146.

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