The nature of emotions comments on Martha Nussbaum's upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions

Abstract
Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 26,150
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Review of Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. [REVIEW]No Authorship Indicated - 2002 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):76-76.
Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.
Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions.Edoardo Zamuner - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
What If Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions?Jason Brennan - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 1--219.
Emotional Feelings.Tim Bloser - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

49 ( #103,646 of 2,152,238 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

0

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums