Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968 (2013)
Many philosophers with hedonistic sympathies (e.g., Mill, Sidgwick, Sumner, Feldman, Crisp, Heathwood, and Bradley) have claimed that well-being is necessarily experiential. Kagan once claimed something slightly different, saying that, although unexperienced bodily events can directly impact a person’s well-being, it is nonetheless true that any change in a person’s well-being must involve a change in her (i.e., either in her mind or in her body). Kagan elaborated by saying that a person’s well-being cannot float freely of her such that it is affected by events that do not affect her (Kagan 1992, 169–189). These two claims—that well-being is necessarily experiential and that changes in well-being must involve changes in the person—are two different ways of specifying the general intuition that a person’s well-being must be strongly tied to her. This general intuition imposes an adequacy constraint on welfare theorizing: To be adequate, a welfare theory cannot allow that someone can be directly benefited by events that are not strongly tied to her. Call this the strong-tie requirement. The strong-tie requirement is easily satisfied by welfare hedonism, but it poses problems for desire-fulfillment welfare theories and objective-list welfare theories. Though a great deal has been written about desire-fulfillment welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement, not as much has been written about objective-list welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement. This paper argues that objective-list welfare theories can satisfy the strong-tie requirement, though probably only if they take a perfectionist form, as opposed to a brute-list form
|Keywords||Well-being Welfare Welfare hedonism Objective-list theories Desire-fulfillment theories Perfectionism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Clarendon Press.
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
What is It for a Life to Go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comment of Waynes Sumner's Theory of Welfare.Thomas S. Petersen - 2009 - Journal of Happiness Studies 10:449-458.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Well-Being and the Priority of Values.Jason R. Raibley - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):593-620.
Welfare Over Time and the Case for Holism.Jason R. Raibley - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):239 - 265.
Dead Sea Apples and Desire-Fulfillment Welfare Theories.William Lauinger - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (03):324-343.
Concepts of Animal Welfare in Relation to Positions in Animal Ethics.Kirsten Schmidt - 2011 - Acta Biotheoretica 59 (2):153-171.
Preferentism and the Paradox of Desire.Bradford Skow - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2009 (3).
Added to index2012-10-18
Total downloads73 ( #72,248 of 2,172,021 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,502 of 2,172,021 )
How can I increase my downloads?