Benacerraf's dilemma and informal mathematics

Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):769-785 (2009)
Abstract
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerrafs work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a Fregean account of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020309990153
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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Citations of this work BETA
On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.

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