Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):769-785 (2009)
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerrafs work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a Fregean account of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
Similar books and articles
Managing Informal Mathematical Knowledge: Techniques From Informal Logic.Andrew Aberdein - 2006 - Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 4108:208--221.
Philosophy of Mathematics: Prospects for the 1990s.Penelope Maddy - 1991 - Synthese 88 (2):155 - 164.
What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity.
Hanna, Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and Benacerraf's Dilemma.Terry F. Godlove - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):447 - 464.
Added to index2009-12-31
Total downloads63 ( #80,894 of 2,152,440 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #185,114 of 2,152,440 )
How can I increase my downloads?