Authors
Gregory Lavers
Concordia University
Abstract
Abstract At the time of The Logical Syntax of Language (Syntax), Quine was, in his own words, a disciple of Carnap’s who read this work page by page as it issued from Ina Carnap’s typewriter. The present paper will show that there were serious problems with how Syntax dealt with ontological claims. These problems were especially pronounced when Carnap attempted to deal with higher order quantification. Carnap, at the time, viewed all talk of reference as being part of the misleading material mode of speech, and as such dismissed, rather than addressed, ontological problems. Central to the analysis in the present paper is the concept of an explication, which was seen by both Carnap and Quine as being of great philosophical importance. It will be shown that the concept of explication played a significant role in how each formulated their mature position on ontology. Both these final positions on ontology can also be seen as a evolving in reaction to Carnap’s flawed handling of ontological matters at the time of Syntax. Carnap, influenced by Tarski’s work on semantics, comes to believe that the concept of reference can be given an acceptable explication, and that by doing so we can see reference to abstract objects as unobjectionable. As a result, Carnap develops a position very different from the one presented in Syntax. Quine strongly rejected the instrumentalism of Syntax, and sought to give an explication of ontological questions that was language independent. This paper closes with a discussion of each’s understanding of the other’s position.
Keywords Rudolf Carnap  W. V. O. Quine  Ontology  Quantification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,308
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Quine on Carnap on Ontology.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
Questions of Ontology.Kathrin Koslicki - 2015 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology After Carnap. Oxford University Press.
Putting the Bite Back Into 'Two Dogmas'.Paul Gregory - 2003 - Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
Carnap and Quine on Empiricism.Robert Almeder - 1997 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (3):349 - 364.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
Ontology, Analyticity, and Meaning : The Quine-Carnap Dispute.Scott Soames - 2009 - In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 424--43.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633 - 648.
Carnap and Translational Indeterminacy.William H. Berge - 1995 - Synthese 105 (1):115 - 121.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-07-06

Total views
16 ( #582,822 of 2,325,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #293,124 of 2,325,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes