Topoi 40 (5):1087-1096 (2018)

Victoria Lavorerio
Universidad de la Republica
In his 2014 article “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements”, Steven Hales argues that relativism is a plausible disagreement resolution strategy for epistemically irresolvable disagreements. I argue that his relativistic strategy is not adequate for disagreements of this kind, because it demands an impossible doxastic state for disputants to resolve the disagreement. Contrarily, Fogelin’s :1–8, 1985) theory of deep disagreement does not run into the same problems. Deep disagreements, according to Fogelin, cannot be resolved through argumentation because the conditions for argumentation are lacking in such contexts. I advance the view that deep disagreements arise due to differences in disputants’ mutually supporting interrelated beliefs. This view avoids the hurdles caused by the tiered structure of support found at the heart of Hales’s view on disagreement: the assumption that belief and perspective can be separated, and that disagreement is located.
Keywords deep disagreements  epistemic relativism
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9558-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
Relativism.Maria Baghramian - 2004 - Routledge.
Meta-Argumentation.Maurice Finocchiaro - 2013 - College Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Fundamental Model of Deep Disagreements.Victoria Lavorerio - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):416-431.
Framing the Epistemic Schism of Statistical Mechanics.Javier Anta - 2021 - Proceedings of the X Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

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