Philosophical Investigations 43 (4):346-362 (2020)

Authors
Victoria Lavorerio
Universidad de la Republica
Abstract
In “The Logic of Deep Disagreements,” Robert Fogelin claims that parties to a deep disagreement lack the common ground needed for arguments to work, making the disagreement impervious to rational resolution. Although Fogelin’s article received numerous responses, there has been no attempt to elucidate the epistemological theory behind Fogelin’s theses. In this article, I examine Fogelin’s theory of deep disagreements in light of his broader philosophy. The picture that emerges is that of relativism of distance, à la Bernard Williams. By interpreting Fogelin’s theory as relativism of distance, it avoids some of the critiques that have been raised against it.
Keywords Deep Disagreements   Robert Fogelin   Epistemic Relativism   Epistemic Contextualism   Epistemology of Disagreements
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DOI 10.1111/phin.12274
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright, A. C. Danto & M. Bochner - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):261-262.
XIV—The Truth in Relativism.Bernard Williams - 1975 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):215-228.

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