On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions

Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319 (2012)
Authors
Gregory Lavers
Concordia University
Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine’s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.
Keywords Carnap  Quine  Analyticity  Explication  Mathematics
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9709-2
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
What Numbers Could Not Be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
In Defense of a Dogma.H. Paul Grice & P. F. Strawson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophical Review. Routledge. pp. 141 - 158.

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