Synthese 124 (1-2):1-43 (2000)
Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '' x '', assimilated to theEnglish ''there is something that is a ''. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
'That'-Clauses and Non-Nominal Quantification.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333.
Open-Endedness, Schemas and Ontological Commitment.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):329-339.
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