Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (2):342-343 (2021)

Authors
Gregory Lavers
Concordia University
Abstract
This book has two main goals: first, to show that Quine's New Foundations set theory is better motivated than often assumed; and second, to defend Quine's philosophy of set theory. It is divided into three parts. The first concerns the history of set theory and argues against readings that see the iterative conception of set being the dominant notion of set from the very beginning. The second part concerns Quine's philosophy of set theory. Part 3 is a contemporary assessment of the philosophical status of NF. Here one of the central targets is Boolos's defense of the iterative conception of set and his dismissal of NF as completely unnatural.As this is a very short review, I will avoid specific points and...
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2021.0041
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