Enough is enough: Pretense and invariance in the semantics of "knows that"

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):211–236 (2005)
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00060.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness.Berislav Marušić - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):60-83.

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