Philosophia:1-21 (forthcoming)

Authors
Holly Lawford-Smith
University of Melbourne
Abstract
From a radical feminist perspective, gender is a cage. Or to be more precise, it’s two cages. If genders are cages, then surely we want to let people out. Being less constrained in our choices is something we all have reason to want: theorists in recent years have emphasized the importance of the capability to do and be many different things. At the very least, we should want an end to sex-based oppression. But what does this entail, when it comes to gender? In this paper, I'll compare four 'transitional pathways', with a view to considering how each relates to the ultimate end of ending sex-based oppression. Should we open the doors to the cages, so that people can move freely between them, but leave the cages themselves in place? (Transgender pathway). Should we add more cages? (Nonbinary pathway). Should we make the cages bigger, so that people have a lot more room to move around inside them? Or should we dismantle the cages, so there are no more genders at all? (Gender abolitionist pathways). Some of these options are ‘gender revisionist’, others are gender abolitionist. I'll argue in favour of a gender abolitionist pathway.
Keywords Sex-based oppression  Gender  Nonbinary  Third gender  Transgender  Gender abolition  Radical feminism  Gender critical feminism  Ideal theory  Non-ideal theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-020-00297-0
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References found in this work BETA

Ideal Vs. Non‐Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.Laura Valentini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):654-664.
Are women adult human females?Alex Byrne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3783-3803.
Gender and Gender Terms1.Elizabeth Barnes - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):704-730.

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