Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):294-307 (2020)

There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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DOI 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.3.2
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References found in this work BETA

The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Paradoxes of Time Travel.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
Foreknowledge Requires Determinism.Patrick Todd - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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