Utilitas 31 (1):83-105 (2019)

Seth Lazar
Australian National University
If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself.
Keywords moral status  agent-centred options  deontology
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820818000201
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References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Killing in Self‐Defense.Jonathan Quong - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):507-537.

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Citations of this work BETA

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What’s Wrong with Automated Influence.Claire Benn & Seth Lazar - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
Market Harms and Market Benefits.Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (2):202-38.

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