Having a concept “see” does not imply attribution of knowledge: Some general considerations in measuring “theories of mind”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):123-124 (1998)
That organisms have a concept “see” does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.
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