Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):75-101 (2014)

Jonathan Lear
University of Chicago
Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which the parts of the soul, rational and non-rational, can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in, he faces Bernard Williams's charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper examines the problem and proposes a way forward, namely, that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the resources for the development of a satisfying Aristotelian moral psychology
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00365.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,949
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
Shame and Necessity.Bernard Williams - 1992 - University of California Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
64 ( #162,751 of 2,439,389 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #282,957 of 2,439,389 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes