Ruhelosigkeit, Phantasie und der Begriff des Geistes

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):49-71 (2009)
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Abstract

To understand the weird intelligibility of irrational acts, we must account for the immanence of irrationality to mind. Traditional approaches which divide the mind into mindlike parts enter the problem at the wrong level: the level of configurations of propositional attitudes. But as in the case of Freud's Rat Man who interprets his irrationality as a case of akrasia in this sense, such approaches presuppose too much rationality in order to capture the phenomenon of irrationality. An explanation must rather enter at the level of the inner structures of mental attitudes and of the possible mental operations on that inner structure – i. e. at the level of non-rational mental activities like „phantasy“ in which the restlessness of mind expresses itself. It is intrinsic to the very idea of mind that mind must sometimes be irrational: it has a tendency to disrupt its own rational functioning.

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Jonathan Lear
University of Chicago

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