Authors
Oliver Lean
University of Bristol
Luca Rivelli
Université Catholique de Louvain
Charles H. Pence
Université Catholique de Louvain
Abstract
Empirical philosophers of science aim to base their philosophical theories on observations of scientific practice. But since there is far too much science to observe it all, how can we form and test hypotheses about science that are sufficiently rigorous and broad in scope, while avoiding the pitfalls of bias and subjectivity in our methods? Part of the answer, we claim, lies in the computational tools of the digital humanities, which allow us to analyze large volumes of scientific literature. Here we advocate for the use of these methods by addressing a number of large-scale, justificatory concerns—specifically, about the epistemic value of journal articles as evidence for what happens elsewhere in science, and about the ability of DH tools to extract this evidence. Far from ignoring the gap between scientific literature and the rest of scientific practice, effective use of DH tools requires critical reflection about these relationships.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1086/715049
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Reading of Scientific Texts: Questions on Interpretation and Evaluation, with Special Reference to the Scientific Writings of Ludwik Fleck.Eva Hedfors - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1):136-158.
An Epistemology of Scientific Practice.C. Kenneth Waters - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):585-611.
Hypothesis Testing in Scientific Practice: An Empirical Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1):1-21.
Ontological Progress in Science.Richard M. Burian & J. Trout - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):177 - 201.
Philosophy of Science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-Based Overview and Quantitative Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-160.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-14

Total views
84 ( #138,403 of 2,506,097 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #33,378 of 2,506,097 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes