No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist?

Philosophical Papers 44 (2):207-232 (2015)
Authors
Baptiste Le Bihan
University of Geneva
Abstract
A dispositional monist believes that all properties are essentially causal. Recently, an overdetermination argument has been proposed by Trenton Merricks to support nihilism about ordinary objects. I argue that this argument can be extended to target both nihilism about ordinary objects and nihilism about physical particles when dispositional monism is assumed. It implies that a philosopher who both endorses dispositional monism and takes seriously the overdetermination argument should not believe in the existence of physical particles. I end up by discussing possible objections. I suggest, then, that if we live in a world that is inhabited by causal properties but not by chairs and tables, then we also live in a world without electrons and quarks, a world of dispositional properties, that is, a world of causal fields.
Keywords dispositions  physical particles  nihilism  eliminativism
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DOI 10.1080/05568641.2015.1056960
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References found in this work BETA

Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1991 - Blackwell.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Building the World From its Fundamental Constituents.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):221-256.

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Citations of this work BETA

The No-Self View and the Meaning of Life.Baptiste Le Bihan - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West 69 (2).
Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):95-111.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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