Intentionality and Continuity of Experience

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (2):235-249 (2017)
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Abstract

My aim is to provide an analysis of cognitive experience from the point of view of philosophy of mind, by identifying and describing different components or features present in it. But different things are called ‘experience’ and some are more complex than other. I will first examine different uses of the word ‘experience’ to clear the way and to avoid cases of circularity. Then I try to restrict the investigation and introduce the mode and content of experience, and take BonJour’s suggestion of what cognitive experience is as a starting point. In my view, the two main features of experience are Horizontal Intentionality and Vertical Intentionality. The first is the most striking and fundamental; it constitutes the continuity of experience. Vertical Intentionality selects objects of experience, so that our experience is always experience of something. In Perception, something is identified and recognized by the application of concepts. Attention is required, especially when we get involved in complicated operations or manipulations. Finally, the last feature is constituted by a huge set of dispositions, particularly abilities to keep track our thoughts and former experiences. Cognitive Experience in the full sense is the result of the interaction and mutual support of these features.

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André Leclerc
Universidade Federal do Ceará

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References found in this work

Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford.
The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter, The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.

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